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Abstract 
This study aims at providing empirical relationship between ECOWAS Common External Tariff and 
macroeconomic variables in Nigeria. The study made use of quarterly time series data between 2005:01 to 2012:04. 
The vector error correction model (VECM) model was used to measure the impact of CET on macroeconomic 
variables in Nigeria. The results revealed that common external tariff (ET) explained (0.006%) in the variance of 
domestic output (DO) in the 2nd period and rose sharply to (0.02%) in the 4th period. The effect of common external 
tariff (ET) on the explained variance of domestic output (DO) declined from (0.07%) to (0.08%) at both 6th and 
7thperiod respectively. However, common external tariff effect (ET) on the variance of domestic output (DO) 
decline to (0.08%) at the 8th periods and stabilized at (0.11%) until the 15th period. The study observed that 
ECOWAS common external tariff (ET) have a positive but minimal effect on macroeconomic performance in 
Nigeria.  
Keywords: Common External Tariff, Domestic Output, government expenditure, Balance of Trade 
 
I. Introduction 
Africa has shown an increased degree of having regional integration as a move towards achieving economic 
development. Some of the regional and sub-regional bodies formed in recent years include: the Common Market 
for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), Economic 
Community of Africa (ECA), Western Africa Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), and the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS). These regional bodies have tended to give their members the 
possibility of specialization and taking advantage of economies of scale and the possibility of trade in likes or 
intra-industry trade (Kaluwa and Kambewa, 2009). 
Nigeria joined other members of the Economic Community of West African States in adopting a common 
external tariff (CET) in 2005 with the sole aim of removing all form of barriers in trade and charging a uniform 
tariff against the rest of the world. ECOWAS is comprised of fifteen member states, eight of which belong to a 
separate regional grouping, that is, the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) composed 
primarily of states in francophone West Africa. Adoption of the WAEMU CET is necessary for (non-WAEMU) 
ECOWAS states in order to support the goal of deepening economic integration throughout the ECOWAS 
region.The proposal was for the adoption of a four-band tariff structured as follows: 0 percent (for products with 
social significance, such as medicine), 5 percent (for necessities and raw materials), 10 percent (for intermediate 
goods) and 20 percent (for finished consumer goods). 
Prior to trade policy reforms among ECOWAS countries, exports within the region was distorted by 
export taxes, overvalued currencies, export licensing, existence of monopoly marketing boards and high import 
duties. Trade policy reform could be said to have moved rapidly in many ECOWAS countries in the 1990s through 
the adoption of a combination of unilateral and regional modalities. However, existing studies on the extent of 
CET adoption and its effect on regional trade agreement among member countries are very few and inconclusive. 
Therefore, the need to examine the ECOWAS common external tariff (CET) and its effect on macroeconomic 
performance in Nigeria, hence, this study. 
 
II. Survey of Literature  
Regional trade agreements are an increasing important element of the global trade environment. Indeed, it is 
estimated that between 50 and 60 per cent of global trade now benefit from regional preferences (WTO, 2005). 
African countries and regional economic communities (RECs) are engaged in the establishment of free trade areas, 
customs union and common markets, and currency and custom unions. These objectives can be achieved through 
trade liberalization programmes focussing on goods as well as services, mechanisms for the free movement of 
persons and of factors of production, harmonization of tax and currency policies. At the sub-regional level, quite 
a number of RECs are implementing trade liberalization programme aimed at eliminating tariff and non-tariff 
barriers, adoption of common external tariff against the rest of the world and facilitating the free movement of 
goods and services. The implementation of these trade liberalization programmes vary from one sub-region to 
another in terms of characteristics, time frames, modalities and pace, but there are a number of common features, 
such as mechanism for the creation of free trade areas, customs unions and common markets within set time frame. 
The study adopts the Viner (1950) theory of regional trade agreements (RTAs). The theory drew the 
distinction between trade-creating and trade-diverting effects resulting from regional trade agreement (RTA) 
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formation. Viner’s contribution showed that even though an RTA liberalizes trade by reducing at least some 
barriers, it does not necessarily follow that this will generate net gains from trade. Net gains would be expected if 
all barriers to trade are reduced on a non-discriminatory basis, but RTAs by their nature discriminate against non-
members. In regional trade agreements (RTAs) distortions between sources of supply are not eliminated, but are 
shifted. If partner country production displaces higher cost domestic production then there will be gains, or trade 
creation. However, if partner country production displaces lower cost imports from the rest of the world, this is 
trade diversion. (Geloso-Grosso, 2001) Since distortions may likely remain in some activities in the economy, it 
may not be necessarily true that removing part of the distortions (for example, eliminating trade barriers on 
UEMOA members but maintaining them on non-members within the ECOWAS countries) is welfare improving. 
However, it has been argued that for any proposed customs union or free trade area there could be a set of common 
external tariffs that would precisely leave the new trading bloc’s trade with non-member countries unchanged, so 
preventing trade diversion from taking place. Member countries in a regional trade agreement (RTA) can be 
affected through different mechanism. One of such mechanisms is when the external barriers of a regional 
arrangement are low; the potential for trade diversion is low because lower external tariffs offer less scope for the 
displacement of imports from non-member countries. Also, market enlargement allows firms to exploit economies 
of scale more fully within a regional trade agreement. The possibilities are that firms in member countries will 
likely produce greater quantities of products after formation of a regional trade agreement. This therefore occurs 
as trade preferences which results in demand shift in favour of intra-regional trade to enable these firms achieve 
greater economies of scale and lower output prices as they capture (and create) larger markets for their outputs at 
home and abroad. Finally, according to Smith and Venables (1988), RTAs may successfully erode market power 
of dominant firms in participating countries through encouraging market entry of competing firms from other 
member countries, bringing lower prices. 
Thus, the potential advantages of trade liberalization and integration for African countries are firmly 
rooted in a theory of economies of scale. The small size of most SSA economies points to unification as a useful 
means of expanding markets and increasing participation in the global economy. Consequently, a relaxation of 
trade restrictions within a given region could reduce internal transport costs, stimulate intraregional trade, and 
ultimately increase the growth and productivity of member states. Additionally, intraregional liberalization could 
encourage African countries to adopt a more outward-oriented attitude towards trade instead of the protectionist, 
inward-oriented mentality which frequently exists. (Ajayi, 2005) 
Similarly, the adoption of the CET constituted a significant structural reform in Nigerian economy which 
resulted in a move from a complicated tiered tariff regime structure to the adoption of a simplified five-band tariff 
regime (Ajayi and Osafo-Kwaako, 2006).  The predominance given to liberalization schemes as tools for intra-
community trade expansion should not conceal the fact that trade liberalization schemes have fairly different 
implementation profiles from one sub-region to another. Some of the RECs are still in the early stages in terms of 
implementation of free trade area, while others have reached the level of a custom union with common external 
tariff in place. Nnanna (2006), opined that, the mandate given to ECOWAS under its treaty is as follows: the 
elimination of customs duties and other charges of equivalent effect in respect of importation and exportation of 
goods and services between member states; the abolition of quantitative and administrative restrictions on trade 
among the member states; the establishment of a common external tariff and a common commercial policy towards 
the third countries; the removal of obstacles to the free movement of persons, services and capital; the 
harmonization of agricultural policies and the promotion of common projects notably in the field of marketing, 
research and agro-industrial enterprises; development of joint transport, communication, energy and other 
infrastructural facilities as well as the evolution of common policy in these fields; the establishment of a fund for 
cooperation and development and such other activities that could further aim of the community as may from time 
to time be undertaken in the common member states. 
Iyoha (2005), pointed out that the increasing marginalization of Africa in worlds trade has been 
aggravated by the excessive dependence of African countries on the European exports markets. In 1988, the 
European Community alone absorbed over 60% of exports of many commodities from Africa. Yet, intra-African 
trade accounted for less than 6% of Africa’s total trade. This low degree of intra-regional trade compares 
unfavourably with Latin America (15%) and Asia (43%). With the industrialization countries placing more and 
more tariff and non-tariff barriers on the manufactured exports of developing countries and the attainment of a 
single European market, it is obvious that continued over-dependence on the European market will become even 
more unrealistic and counterproductive. In fact, until African countries resolve to increase intra-regional trade, the 
continent will continue to be marginalized in the world trade and become increasingly irrelevant in global 
economic affairs. Zissimos (2002), argues that free trade agreement are regional because, in their absence, optimal 
tariffs are higher against regional partners than countries outside the region. The optimal tariffs shift rents from 
foreign firms to domestic citizens. Lower transport costs imply higher rents and therefore higher tariffs. So regional 
free trade agreements have a higher pay-off than non-regional free trade agreements. Therefore, adoption of the 
common external tariff provided an opportunity of streamlining external tariff, ensuring that the tariff regime was 
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simplified, transparent and predictable (Ajayi and Osafo-Kwaako, 2006). 
Cooperation among developing countries for the expansion of trade in general and regional trade 
agreements RTAs has been subject to controversy in the literature between neoclassical/neo-liberal economists 
and their opponents. The proponents of universal free trade have argued against discriminatory trade agreements, 
in general, and FTAs among developing countries for the expansion of S-S trade, in particular. For example, it has 
been argued that regional integration among developing countries would result in diversion of some trade from 
low-cost to high-cost producers and would involve welfare costs, so it is undesirable and unconvincing (Viner, 
1950 and Greenaway and Milner (1990). Corden (1993) goes even further, arguing that developing countries will 
be far better off if they liberalize their trade regime “unilaterally in a non-discriminatory fashion” rather than 
targeting markets in the South. Some others argue that RTAs between the South and North are more advantageous 
than RTAs among developing countries (World Bank, 2000, Moen, 1998 and Subramanian and Tamirisa, 2001); 
that “South-South trade does not clearly have a vast development potential”, as the theory of comparative 
advantage would indicate that “North-South trade would achieve higher gains” and “the potential for trade based 
on economies of scale among relatively small and poor countries of the South is uncertain” (Kowaski and Shepherd, 
2006). However, inefficiency of regionalization has been disproved empirically (e.g. Ng, 2003; Baier, Bergstrand 
and Vidal, 2007); regionalism has trade creation effects not only for members but also for trade with third parties 
(Cernat, 2003).The neo-liberal views against S-S trade are based on their ideological bias in favour of universal 
free trade, which is, in turn, based on the static version of the theory of comparative cost advantage. This theory is 
based, further, on hypothetical and unrealistic assumptions, including full employment of resources, availability 
of the same technology to all countries, independence of present and future costs of production, as well as the lack 
of influence of experience on the production cost, the lack of external economies, atomistic units of production, 
constant returns to scale and the lack of risk and of influence of power in trade. The opponents of South-South 
trade do not take into account the characteristics of developing countries, such as underemployment of resources 
and their lack of technological capabilities; existence of scale economies in many manufacturing industries, and 
the inter dependence of present and future costs. 
In the same context, contrasting Neo-classical theorists, Kaldor (1972) suggested that developing 
countries should be concerned mainly with promoting “creative efficiency” (growth and development) rather than 
allocative efficiency, (i.e. allocation of given and “fully employed” resources among different activities efficiently) 
which is the concern of the static theory of comparative cost advantage. In other words, they should be concerned 
with attaining dynamic comparative advantage for the sake of promoting “creative efficiency”. However, to attain 
dynamic comparative advantage requires actions by the government; it will not be attained automatically through 
the operation of market forces alone (Cline, 1983; Amsden, 1992; Shafaeddin, 2005a and 2005.b). 
List (1856) introduced, inter alia, the idea of regional integration in his proposal for German unification 
and cooperation among European countries, which eventually led to the signature of the Treaty of Rome in 1958. 
In the early 1950s, Prebisch (1984) provided the strongest dynamic argument for regional integration in developing 
countries in the context of his theory of “collective import substitution” for industrialization and upgrading of the 
industrial structure (Prebisch, 1984, Shafaeddin, 2005a). For many years, following the initial ideas of Prebisch, 
arguments in favour of S-S trade cantered mainly on the issues of small size of the domestic market, economies of 
scale, problems of access to developed country markets (see, for example, UNCTAD, 1986and Agatiello, 2007) 
or a slowdown in growth rates of developed-country economies thus growing potential for S-S trade expansion 
(South Centre 1996). Some elements of these arguments are no longer valid. For example, access to markets of 
the North has improved considerably. Moreover, the experience of 1960s and 1970s has shown that S-S trade will 
not necessarily expand, even when regional preferential or free trade agreements are signed among a number of 
developing countries (de Melo and Panagariya, 1993). One argument in favour of, S-S trade is that, trade among 
equal partners will have a positive influence on the net barter terms of trade (Sarkar and Singer, 1991). Another is 
that too much reliance on trade with the North will increase vulnerability and risks of dependence on trade 
(Hirschman, 1968). But, it should be noted that geographical diversification would be possible only to the extent 
that alternative sources of supply are available in the South as many developing countries have similar production 
structure and depend on production and exports of primary commodities.  
Similarly, Mengistae and Teal (1998) examined the role of trade liberalization, regional integration and 
firm performance in Africa’s manufacturing sector. Their study attempt to understand the role of regional trade 
and its effects on the performance of firms. The evidence from the study revealed that unilateral tariff reductions 
have enhanced regional trade. Regional trade can be a method for firm growth provided it is treated as a stepping 
stone to the international market and used as a device to protect firms that cannot compete international. Members’ 
countries in a RTA can be affected through different mechanism. One of such mechanisms is when the external 
barriers of a regional arrangement are low; the potential for trade diversion is low external tariffs offer less scope 
for the displacement of imports from non-member countries. Consequently, a relaxation of trade restrictions within 
a given regional could reduce internal transport costs; stimulate inter-regional trade, and ultimate increase the 
growth and productivity of member states.       
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III. Data and Methodology 
This study uses quarterly time series data sourced from the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) 2012 edition. For the 
purpose of analysing and forecasting macroeconomic activity and tracing the effect of policy changes and 
innovations on the economy, scholars have found that simple, small scale VARs without possible flawed 
theoretical foundation have proved as good or better than large scale structural equation system, (Greene, 2008). 
The quarterly data is used in order to allow for tracing out the effect of CET adoption on economic performance 
in Nigeria more precise than with annual data. The study adopts vector error correction mechanism (VECM) model. 
The VECM model allows the long-term behavior of the endogenous variables to converge to cointegrating (i.e. 
long term equilibrium) relationships while allowing a wide range of short term dynamics. Thus, testing for 
cointegration in the data is necessary step in this analysis, because the presence of cointegration may influence the 
final form of the model, as it makes the variables meaningful, and do not lose any valuable long term information 
which would result if we were to use their first difference instead. To test for cointegration, the conventional 
Johansen cointegration procedure will be used. 
The research study considers a vector of four variables: 
 ∆ , = 	 ∆	 , ∆
 , ∆ , ∆	 ,       (1)  
Where  = is a 4×1 vector of variables,   	   = the total government expenditure; 
  = balance of trade;   = domestic output; and 	 = common external tariff (CET). 
The first step, after determining level of integration of the variables included, is to estimate form of VAR  
 ∆ , = 	()        (2)  
Where ∆a vector of first differences of the variables, () is a lag polynomial and  is a vector of disturbances 
with estimated variances of ∑. In order to disentangle the impact of various structural shocks, the coefficients of 
the structural model need to be estimated: 
 ∆ , = 	()         (3)  
Where  is an n×1 vector of unobserved mutually interrelated shocks that are interpreted as above. The long-run 
representation of the VAR can be represented as: 
  	
∆				 = 	 
(1)(1)(1) (1)(1)(1)(1) (1)(1)(1)(1) (1) (1) (1) (1)  (1)!"
"#     (4)  
Where (1) = 	$ +	 +		 +...are the long-run multipliers of the VAR. Equations (1) and (2) suggest linear 
relationship in  
  =	$          (5)  
Where	$ is the 4×4 matrix that defines the contemporaneous structure amongst the variables, which is required 
to be identified to determine the vector structural shocks,  from the estimated disturbance vector  . If there is 
no cointegration in the data, then the standard VAR analysis applies, if, on the other hand, there exist one or more 
cointegration equation, then the VAR should take them into account through an error correction term. The VAR 
that incorporates cointegration is called vector error correction mechanism (VECM) model. The VECM model 
allows the long-term behaviour of the endogenous variables to converge to cointegrating (i.e. long term equilibrium) 
relationships while allowing a wide range of short term dynamics. Thus, testing for cointegration in the data is 
necessary step in this analysis, because the presence of cointegration may influence the final form of the model, 
as it makes the variables meaningful, and do not lose any valuable long term information which would result if we 
were to use their first difference instead. To test for cointegration, the conventional Johansen cointegration 
procedure will be used.                
The technique provides us with two tools to shed light on the behaviour of these variables in the face of 
a shock: the impulse response functions and forecast error variance decomposition.  The impulse response 
functions allow the possibility of investigating the dynamic response of the variables to different shocks within 
the system. The forecast error variance decomposition gives the percentage of the variance accounted for by each 
of the shocks at different horizons, and shows the relative contribution of the structural shocks to the forecast error 
variance of the variables. 
 
IV. Discussions and Interpretation of Results 
(a) Impulse Response Analysis 
The table (V) and figure (I) in the appendix revealed that common external tariff (ET) has no effect on 
the government expenditure (GE) in the first period. At the second period the effect of common external tariff (ET) 
on government expenditure (GE) was felt and it is positive (2708.203). Conversely, the effect of common external 
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tariff (ET) on government expenditure (GE) decline to (2373.635) in the third period. This implies that as a result 
of the adoption of common external tariff in Nigeria, the government expenditure has been on the increase but 
with a minimal level of fluctuation. In the fifth period, the effect of common external tariff (ET) on government 
expenditure decline to (1471.372).  
 Common external tariff (ET) has a sustained and continuous positive effect on government expenditure 
(GE) all through the mid-term period (i.e. period 6 – 10). The effect of common external tariff (ET) on government 
expenditure (GE) decline from (1314.172) to (1212.700) at the sixth and the seventh period respectively. 
Furthermore, the effect of common external tariff (ET) on government expenditure (GE) increased from (1596.396) 
at the eight period to (1776.912) at the ninth period up till (1922.684) at the tenth period.  In the long run, the 
positive effect of common external tariff (ET) on government expenditure (GE) was sustained such that at the 
fifteen periods, the effect of common external tariff (ET) on government expenditure (GE) stands at (1808.299). 
Common external tariff (ET) has no effect on the balance of trade (BT) in the first period. At the second 
period the effect of common external tariff (ET) on balance of trade (BT) was felt and it is positive (7954.772). 
Furthermore, the effect of common external tariff (ET) on balance of trade (BT) increased to (7198.415) in the 
third period. This implies that the adoption of common external tariff in Nigeria led to an increase in the degree of 
openness of Nigeria to international trade, thus, common external tariff (ET) having positive effect on balance of 
trade (BT). The effect of common external tariff (ET) on balance of trade (BT) decline to (7198.412) in the fifth 
period. 
Common external tariff (ET) has a sustained and continuous positive effect on balance of trade (BT) all 
through the mid-term period (i.e. period 6 – 10). The effect of common external tariff (ET) on balance of trade 
(BT) decline from (5931.919) to (5465.643) at the sixth and the seventh period respectively. Furthermore, the 
effect of common external tariff (ET) on balance of trade (BT) increased from (6453.976) at the eight period to 
(7191.062) at the ninth period up till (7509251) at the tenth period.  In the long run, the positive effect of common 
external tariff (ET) on balance of trade (BT) was sustained such that at the fifteen periods, the effect of common 
external tariff (ET) on balance of trade (BT) stands at (7007.911).    
 Table 4.1 and figure 4.1 also show that common external tariff (ET) has no effect on the domestic output 
(DO) in the first period but in the second period the effect of common external tariff (ET) on domestic output (DO) 
is positive (4418.060). Conversely, common external tariff (ET) had negative effect on domestic output (DO) from 
periods (3 – 15) but the negativity is highly felt at the fifth period (-19607.54). This implies that the ECOWAS 
common external tariff (CET), has led to a reduction in the productivity level of the economy. The crude oil export 
is the only component of domestic outputs (DO) that command insignificant interest in international market; 
therefore, domestic output does not command good market price and the inflow of foreign exchange earnings to 
the economy is only limited to the Nigerian oil sector. 
(b) Variance Decomposition Analysis 
The table (VI) in the appendix presents the variance decomposition of the variables used in the model. The common 
external tariff (ET) explained (0.61%) in the variance in government expenditure (GE) in the second period and 
rose sharply to (0.69%) in the fourth period. The effect of common external tariff (ET) on the explained variance 
in government expenditure declined from (0.62%) to (0.50%) at both sixth and seventh period respectively. 
However, common external tariff effect (ET) on variance in government expenditure (GE) declined to (0.47%) at 
the eighth periods and stabilized at (0.46%) until the fifteenth period. Also, the common external tariff (ET) 
explained (3.2%) in the variance in balance of trade (BT) in the second period and rose sharply to (5.5%) in the 
fourth period. The effect of common external tariff (ET) on the explained variance in balance of trade (BT) 
declined from (4.9%) to (4.6%) at both sixth and seventh period respectively. However, common external tariff 
effect (ET) on variance balance of trade (BT) decline to (4.4%) at the eighth periods and stabilized at (5.5%) until 
the fifteenth period.  This implies that the introduction of ECOWAS common external tariff (ET) have a positive 
but small effect on the performance of macroeconomic variables in Nigeria. This is due to the fact that (ET) was 
only able to explain less than (6%) effect of macroeconomic variables in Nigeria, (ET) is still at the 
introductory/infant stage in Nigeria, if the common external tariff (ET) policy is adopted for a longer period in 
Nigeria, then, there would be a need to re-examine the effect of CET on macroeconomic variables in Nigeria. 
 Furthermore, the common external tariff (ET) explained (0.006%) in the variance in domestic output (DO) 
in the second period and rose sharply to (0.02%) in the fourth period. The effect of common external tariff (ET) 
on the explained variance in domestic output (DO) declined from (0.07%) to (0.08%) at both sixth and seventh 
period respectively.  
However, common external tariff effect (ET) on variance domestic output (DO) decline to (0.08%) at the 
eighth periods and stabilized at (0.11%) until the fifteenth period. This also implies that the introduction of 
ECOWAS common external tariff (ET) have a positive but small effect on the performance of macroeconomic 
variables in Nigeria. This is due to the fact that (ET) was only able to explain less than (3%) effect of 
macroeconomic variables in Niger, (ET) is still at the introductory/infant stage in Nigeria, if the common external 
tariff (ET) policy is adopted for a longer period in Nigeria, then, there would be a need to re-examine the effect of 
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CET on macroeconomic variables in the economy. 
 The salient result from the variance decomposition is that ‘‘own shocks’’ constituted the predominant 
source of shocks that caused the dismal macroeconomic performance in Nigeria. Government Expenditure (GE) 
own shocks account for 100%, 70%, 46% and 36% in the 1st, 6th, 10th, and 15th quarters respectively, Balance of 
Trade (BT) own shocks account for 78%, 31|%, 40% and 43% in the 1st, 6th, 10th, and 15th quarters respectively 
while Domestic Output own shocks only account for 23%, 9%, 8% and 7.6% in the 1st, 6th, 10th, and 15th quarters 
respectively. Thus, Domestic Output (DO) own shocks could only explain less than 25% of the forecast error in 
domestic output while shocks to domestic output (DO) is explained more by variation in both Government 
Expenditure (GE) which account for 30%, 39%, 39%, and 39% in the 1st, 6th, 10th, and 15th quarters respectively 
and Balance of Trade (BT) which account for 47%, 51%, 53%, and 53% in the 1st, 6th, 10th, and 15th quarters 
respectively which account for the small value of domestic output (DO) own shocks. 
 
V. Findings and Policy Implications 
The common external tariff (ET) has positive effect on government expenditure (GE) and balance of trade (BT) 
which is sustained such that at the fifteen periods, the effect of common external tariff (ET) on government 
expenditure (GE) stands at (1808.299) and  balance of trade (BT) (7007.911) respectively. Conversely, the effect 
of common external tariff (ET) on domestic output (DO) is negative. This implies that Nigeria domestic outputs 
(DO) apart from crude oil are insignificant in international market; therefore, domestic output does not command 
good market price and the inflow of foreign exchange earnings to the economy. The variance decomposition of 
the variables used in the study revealed that ‘‘own shocks’’ constituted the predominant source of shocks to 
measure the effect of common external tariff (CET) on performance of macroeconomic variables in Nigeria. 
 The adoption and full implementation of common external tariff (CET) are essential tasks that must be 
accomplished within the shortest period of time with a view of establishing single regional market in West Africa 
and taking full advantages of trade liberalization among member states in the ECOWAS sub-region. The Nigerian 
government should ensure stability in her macroeconomic system being the largest economy in the ECOWAS sub-
region which determines the overall economic growth of the ECOWAS sub-region as a whole and also fast track 
the speed of her tariff reform process in line with other ECOWAS countries so as to play a leading role in 
ECOWAS and also benefit from trade liberalization as a result of the relative openness of Nigeria economic system 
to international trade. 
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Appendix 
Table I: Augmented Dickey – Fuller (ADF) Test 
Variables Series Levels First Difference Second Difference 
Government Expenditure GE 0.080431 (-2.392311) -3.601743** 
Balance of Trade BT -1.957658 -3.081689**  
Domestic Output DO 0.099817 (-2.033201) -3.149418** 
Common External Tariff  ET -3.094296** -2.717266**  
*, **, ***, indicates 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively. 
Source: Author’s Computation 
 
Table II: Phillips – Perron (PP) Test 
Variables Series Levels First Difference 
Government Expenditure GE 0.502039 -2.973935*** 
Balance of Trade BT -0.993468 -3.400081** 
Domestic Output DO 0.149136 -4.028227* 
Common External Tariff ET -2.312025 -3.314261** 
*, **, ***, indicates 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively. 
Source: Author’s Computation 
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Table III. Johansen Cointegration Test 
Sample: 2005:1 2012:4 
Included observations: 21 
Test assumption: Linear deterministic trend in the 
data 
    
Series: GE BT DO ET  
Lags interval: 1 to 2 
 Likelihood 5 Percent 1 Percent Hypothesized 
Eigenvalue Ratio Critical 
Value 
Critical 
Value 
No. of CE(s) 
 0.760075  58.50077  47.21  54.46       None ** 
 0.514473  38.52477  29.68  35.65    At most 1 
 0.331563  8.508724  15.41  20.04    At most 2 
 0.002361  0.049638   3.76   6.65    At most 3 
*(**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at 5% (1%) significance level 
L.R test indicates 2cointegrating equation (s) at 5% significance level 
Source: Author’s Computation 
 
Table IV. Vector Error Correction Estimates 
 
 Sample(adjusted): 2005:4 2012:4 
 Included observations: 21 after adjusting endpoints 
 Standard errors & t-statistics in parentheses 
Cointegrating Eq:  CointEq1    
GE(-1)  1.000000    
     
BT(-1)  3.399214    
  (0.27476)    
  (12.3717)    
     
DO(-1)  0.236718    
  (0.04421)    
  (5.35404)    
     
ET(-1) -0.600428    
  (0.05921)    
 (-10.1414)    
     
C -3019991.    
Error Correction: D(GE) D(BT) D(DO) D(ET) 
CointEq1 -0.089731 -0.243822 -0.176748  0.225504 
  (0.10266)  (0.14595)  (1.75239)  (0.95461) 
 (-0.87406) (-1.67064) (-0.10086)  (0.23623) 
     
D(GE(-1)) -0.048886 -1.907007  7.478351  2.073339 
  (1.30542)  (1.85582)  (22.2832)  (12.1387) 
 (-0.03745) (-1.02758)  (0.33561)  (0.17080) 
     
D(GE(-2))  0.048853 -0.242606 -1.636548  1.704015 
  (1.19705)  (1.70175)  (20.4332)  (11.1310) 
  (0.04081) (-0.14256) (-0.08009)  (0.15309) 
     
D(BT(-1))  0.151414  1.016795 -3.666990 -1.050612 
  (0.41833)  (0.59472)  (7.14086)  (3.88997) 
  (0.36194)  (1.70971) (-0.51352) (-0.27008) 
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D(BT(-2))  0.114598  0.433337  0.523753 -0.744503 
  (0.46249)  (0.65749)  (7.89464)  (4.30060) 
  (0.24778)  (0.65907)  (0.06634) (-0.17312) 
     
D(DO(-1)) -0.008993  0.065617 -0.269316 -0.174230 
  (0.02686)  (0.03818)  (0.45842)  (0.24972) 
 (-0.33486)  (1.71868) (-0.58748) (-0.69769) 
     
D(DO(-2))  0.002478  0.027703  0.542210 -0.013584 
  (0.04119)  (0.05855)  (0.70303)  (0.38298) 
  (0.06017)  (0.47313)  (0.77124) (-0.03547) 
     
D(ET(-1))  0.029329  0.098002  0.029615  0.340599 
  (0.10922)  (0.15527)  (1.86432)  (1.01558) 
  (0.26853)  (0.63118)  (0.01588)  (0.33537) 
     
D(ET(-2)) -0.028052 -0.025698  0.000208 -0.163343 
  (0.09006)  (0.12804)  (1.53736)  (0.83748) 
 (-0.31147) (-0.20071)  (0.00014) (-0.19504) 
     
C  34429.70  56050.86 -118208.3 -100090.5 
  (41245.5)  (58635.8)  (704049.)  (383530.) 
  (0.83475)  (0.95592) (-0.16790) (-0.26097) 
 R-squared  0.354477  0.418274  0.238014  0.136384 
 Adj. R-squared -0.173678 -0.057684 -0.385430 -0.570211 
 Sum sq. resids  9.69E+09  1.96E+10  2.82E+12  8.38E+11 
 S.E. equation  29680.42  42194.53  506636.4  275989.7 
 F-statistic  0.671161  0.878804  0.381773  0.193015 
 Log likelihood -239.2712 -246.6591 -298.8547 -286.0986 
 Akaike AIC  23.74012  24.44372  29.41473  28.19987 
 Schwarz SC  24.23751  24.94111  29.91212  28.69726 
 Mean dependent  29133.30 -16077.19  126064.7  15412.24 
 S.D. dependent  27396.53  41027.79  430431.6  220248.9 
 Determinant Residual Covariance  1.11E+37   
 Log Likelihood -1014.861   
 Akaike Information Criteria  100.8439   
 Schwarz Criteria  103.0324   
 
Table V. Impulse Response of GE, BT, DO and ET to One S.D. ET Innovation 
Period GE BT DO ET 
 1  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  32548.24 
 2  2708.203  7954.772  4418.060  39227.16 
 3  2373.635  9221.124 -6764.219  34306.22 
 4  2371.892  9863.104 -10948.85  32693.31 
 5  1471.372  7198.412 -19507.54  34721.94 
 6  1314.172  5931.919 -16119.54  37782.92 
 7  1212.700  5465.643 -17146.87  38341.28 
 8  1596.396  6453.976 -13182.85  37475.36 
 9  1776.912  7191.062 -15297.04  35873.31 
 10  1922.684  7509.251 -14276.61  35540.63 
 11  1832.904  7181.944 -16176.35  35882.13 
 12  1792.036  6855.887 -14798.59  36735.80 
 13  1742.730  6707.941 -15226.88  37000.50 
 14  1788.970  6845.381 -14061.03  36945.66 
 15  1808.299  7007.911 -14683.58  36561.71 
 Ordering: GE BT DO ET     
Source: Author’s Computation 
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Figure I: Impulse Response Graph 
 
Source: Author’s Computation 
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Table VI. Variance Decomposition 
Variance Decomposition of GE:      
Period S.E. GE BT DO ET 
 1  21481.11  100.0000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 2  34797.97  96.47490  0.205435  2.713967  0.605696 
 3  44466.83  93.22956  0.728732  5.385836  0.655870 
 4  51858.91  86.87471  1.560881  10.87300  0.691409 
 5  58026.89  79.45527  3.632764  16.29543  0.616530 
 6  63927.56  70.08491  7.334129  22.03073  0.550228 
 7  69532.89  61.71352  11.73073  26.06024  0.495509 
 8  74942.99  54.67279  15.73093  29.12435  0.471926 
 9  79763.74  49.72051  18.65636  31.15689  0.466233 
 10  84235.51  46.03838  20.69975  32.79172  0.470144 
 11  88349.19  43.37981  22.14967  34.00010  0.470422 
 12  92307.54  41.18108  23.32804  35.02224  0.468631 
 13  96067.46  39.38462  24.33296  35.81685  0.465574 
 14  99703.62  37.81822  25.20902  36.50833  0.464430 
 15  103175.1  36.51694  25.93554  37.08310  0.464420 
 Variance Decomposition of BT:      
 Period S.E. GE BT DO ET 
 1  30538.16  21.54373  78.45627  0.000000  0.000000 
 2  44734.99  30.10512  66.73060  0.002292  3.161993 
 3  56466.01  42.17549  53.15048  0.022573  4.651456 
 4  66710.92  54.81324  39.53089  0.137459  5.518409 
 5  75585.25  61.69345  32.37485  0.726050  5.205648 
 6  82586.39  62.35738  30.78592  1.980330  4.876367 
 7  89163.37  58.86473  33.42614  3.149867  4.559265 
 8  95441.89  54.64856  36.88896  4.026059  4.436418 
 9  101097.7  51.79923  39.21568  4.525227  4.459864 
 10  106198.3  50.36684  40.18998  4.901444  4.541736 
 11  111023.2  49.68814  40.54480  5.193033  4.574023 
 12  115712.3  49.04945  40.91430  5.474386  4.561868 
 13  120282.0  48.28275  41.48380  5.700606  4.532842 
 14  124709.6  47.47776  42.11826  5.885989  4.517991 
 15  128950.9  46.84028  42.61675  6.021946  4.521022 
 Variance Decomposition of DO:      
 Period S.E. GE BT DO ET 
 1  366676.5  29.52683  47.34680  23.12637  0.000000 
 2  549739.1  35.53327  49.34200  15.11827  0.006459 
 3  775150.1  37.36705  49.62521  12.99687  0.010863 
 4  910698.8  38.65027  50.44779  10.87962  0.022324 
 5  1031026.  39.01679  50.74380  10.18619  0.053216 
 6  1108817.  39.25316  51.23008  9.449616  0.067145 
 7  1184100.  39.21927  51.54938  9.151496  0.079848 
 8  1245527.  39.20121  51.97265  8.742776  0.083369 
 9  1309407.  39.12552  52.26900  8.516397  0.089081 
 10  1365603.  39.10083  52.57016  8.236187  0.092830 
 11  1422033.  39.06382  52.75918  8.078448  0.098549 
 12  1473350.  39.05084  52.94454  7.902728  0.101892 
 13  1525178.  39.02594  53.07093  7.798084  0.105052 
 14  1574465.  39.01379  53.20515  7.674504  0.106554 
 15  1624090.  38.99800  53.30695  7.586740  0.108316 
 Variance Decomposition of ET:      
 Period S.E. GE BT DO ET 
 1  199746.7  95.98485  1.301635  0.058325  2.655192 
 2  329104.8  96.40092  0.499524  0.700737  2.398816 
 3  424175.8  96.66937  0.318081  0.914411  2.098137 
 4  493892.5  96.02448  0.635308  1.354424  1.985788 
 5  551346.6  95.39857  1.034246  1.577092  1.990091 
 6  602328.2  94.78903  1.330537  1.819489  2.060944 
 7  650514.2  94.53408  1.397213  1.954383  2.114320 
 8  695697.4  94.30030  1.432663  2.128261  2.138772 
 9  737744.4  94.10708  1.487798  2.266751  2.138370 
 10  776485.7  93.83317  1.610219  2.416794  2.139813 
 11  812902.1  93.59293  1.739264  2.520581  2.147230 
 12  847712.5  93.38272  1.846594  2.608390  2.162297 
 13  881540.6  93.25197  1.907452  2.664874  2.175699 
 14  914384.8  93.15096  1.946336  2.717244  2.185463 
 15  946199.8  93.07467  1.975983  2.759072  2.190275 
 Ordering: GE BT DO ET      
 
